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Abstract. Most attempts to craft a definition of disease seem to have tackled two tasks simultaneously: 1) trying
to create a series of inclusion and exclusion criteria that correspond to medical usage of the word disease and 2)
using this definition to understand the essence of what disease is. The first task has been somewhat accomplished,
but cannot reach closure because the concept of “disease” is based on a prototype, not a logical category. The
second task cannot be accomplished by deduction, but only by understanding how the body works and what each
component is for, in evolutionary detail. An evolutionary view of the origins of the body and its vulnerabilities
that result in disease provides an objective foundation for recognizing pathology. Our social definition of disease
will remain contentious, however, because values vary, and because the label “disease” changes judgments about
the moral status of people with various conditions, and their rights to medical and social resources.
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The problem of defining disease has occupied so many
good minds for so long with so much continuing
contention, that it seems foolhardy for a nonspecialist
to even venture thoughts on the issue. However, the
very lack of consensus suggests that the question may
be either miscast or unanswerable. Given this situation,
it seems worthwhile to examine the question from the
perspective of a secure scientific foundation, that of
evolutionary biology (Nesse and Williams, 1995).
As best I can understand it, the quest has gener-
ally been for a series of words that define disease
in a way that matches conventional use of the word
and that provides insight into the essence of disease
(Humber and Almeder, 1997). These two aims are
actually quite distinct, and may require very different
approaches. The first aim attempts to define disease
by crafting phrases whose intersections create a Venn
space that encircles all that we mean by disease and
nothing else. The enterprise has made considerable
progress, with most authorities specifying a state of
the body that differs in disadvantageous ways from
species typical states. All of these definitions, however,
fail in some respect or another to fully satisfy the
criterion of matching common medical usage. For
instance, some include pregnancy as a disease, but
exclude upper respiratory infections (Clouser et al.,
1997). I suspect this difficulty arises because human
concepts like disease refer, not to categories defined by
logical inclusion and exclusion criteria, but to proto-
types. In the case of disease, this prototype approach
makes great sense. The disease concept must have
emerged when people tried to communicate to each
other that something was wrong with their bodies,
whether from pneumonia, cancer, an infected wound,
or kidney stones. People with no idea about microbes,
genes, or even anatomy, must have used the concept
of disease to refer quite generally to any undesir-
able bodily condition, and perhaps to mental condi-
tions as well. In those days, such conditions could
be identified only by suffering, disability, or cues
that indicated increased vulnerability to suffering or
disability. From this vantage point, the very origins
of the disease concept involve a value judgment –
suffering and disability are undesirable. Whether this
value judgment exists only in our evolved minds is
another matter, but our negative judgments of suffering
and disability are by no means arbitrary, having been
shaped by natural selection. The utility of pain as a
motivator of escape and avoidance depends, after all,
on its intrinsic aversive character.
The second goal has been to use a definition of
disease to gain insight into its nature, often with the
implicit assumption that disease exists as an ideal
form. In recent writing, this question seems to have
been posed as a choice between naturalistic views of
disease, such as those of Boorse, versus normative
positions, as proposed by Englehardt (Boorse, 1997;
Englehardt, 1996, pp. 189–238). I can see the issue,
but it is not clear to me that these positions are mutu-
ally exclusive alternatives (Kovács, 1998). Disease
can refer to specific objective bodily conditions, and
yet the interpretation of those conditions, and their
aluation, may vary from culture to culture. Further-
more, the social significance of defining a condition
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as a disease varies considerably. The separate, and
to my mind more fundamental question, is whether
there is some objective way of specifying when a body
is abnormal and when it is not. This is probably not
susceptible to deductive analysis, but requires, instead,
a full knowledge of how every aspect of the body
works, how it contributes a fitness advantage, and how
it was shaped by natural selection. In most instances,
our knowledge about the body provides a basis for
strong opinion, in many cases a definitive opinion.
Nonetheless, we don’t understand everything, so we
cannot always determine whether a condition is a
disease or not. If we did have a full and detailed under-
standing of every aspect of the body and its origins,
this would, I believe, provide an objective basis for
determining if any given condition is pathological or
not.
Interestingly, debates about the definition of
disease often mix these two goals. Actually, three
goals could be identified, if one wanted to consider
the social significance of the label “disease,” sepa-
rately from the mere designation of a condition as a
disease. For instance, Boorse claims that disease can
be defined apart from social values, but his definition
relies on statistical normality rather than to any biolog-
ical criterion, and he assesses the quality of a definition
by how well it conforms to how doctors use the word
disease.
Origins of the idea of disease in human experience
and desires
We have already noted that the concept of disease
undoubtedly arose early in human speech and cogni-
tion to describe undesirable bodily conditions. People
want their bodies to be healthy instead of sick, and they
created words to describe these desirable and undesir-
able states. As time went on, however, several other
questions arose. Even if we know what we mean by
disease, what is it? Where does it come from? Why
does it exist at all? What can we do about it? Is
it necessary? Can it be prevented? Now instead of
mere definition, we need a causal analysis. The core
simple notion of disease indicates that something is
wrong with the body. Some mechanism is not working
correctly. This implies, of course, that we know what
“working correctly” means. It suggests that we know
how to recognize normality. Often, of course, we can.
Cancer is abnormal, shivering is normal. But as soon as
we inquire deeply, our intuition fails us. Is depression
an adaptation or a disease, given that natural selec-
tion may have shaped a system to turn off motivation
in situations where action is likely to be maladaptive
(Nesse, 2000)? Diabetes of pregnancy is a disease for
the mother but it seems to exist to benefit the fetus
(Haig, 1993).
The difficulty here is understanding what we mean
by normal. Reference to statistical norms is helpful,
especially if care is taken to adjust these norms for
age and sex (Boorse, 1997). Nonetheless, tooth caries
and heart disease are statistically normal in many
cultures, but still abnormal because they interfere with
function. Other conditions, such as manic-depressive
illness, may even give a selective advantage, and
yet be abnormal. A deep understanding of what
is abnormal requires a richly detailed understanding
of what is normal. Statistical generalizations will
not suffice. Instead, we require nothing less than a
complete knowledge of what the body is for, how
it works, and, especially, how it came to have its
current form. If we had this knowledge in hand,
then we could define abnormality with reference to
deviations from normality, not needing to resort to
either statistical or value laden information. In some
cases pathognomonic signs define the presence of a
disease (Wulff and Gøtzsche, 2000). The problem is,
of course, that not all diseases can be sharply distin-
guished from normal. Our knowledge is limited. On
the other hand, we now know a great deal about he
design and function of the body and recently, we have
gained a much better understanding of how the body
was shaped by natural selection and for what. The rest
of this article will attempt to determine how helpful
this knowledge can be in deepening our understanding
of what disease is.
Some contributions from an evolutionary
perspective
The benefits of an evolutionary approach to under-
standing what disease is emerge largely from a series
of distinct principles. These are listed below, with
details and their significance expanded in subsequent
exposition.
1. The values that humans use to decide what is
disease are socially influenced, but they are built
on preferences shaped by natural selection.
2. Defenses are not diseases but evolved solutions to
challenges. The suffering associated with defenses
is a product of natural selection. Failure to express
a defense in response to a challenge results in
disease.
3. Individual health is not the expected outcome
of natural selection except insofar as it contrib-
utes to reproductive success. When health and
reproductive success conflict, natural section will
benefit reproduction at the expense of health.
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4. Bodies are not shaped to maximize individual
reproductive success, but the inclusive fitness of
genes, that is, the net benefit to genes including
those in an individual and genes identical by
descent in kin.
5. Interference with mechanisms that maximize
inclusive fitness in the natural environment
offers an objective foundation for distinguishing
pathology from normality if we understand
enough about the mechanisms and the environ-
ment.
6. Because we define health in terms of individual
functioning and well-being, we often call a condi-
tion a disease even if it maximizes fitness.
7. What is beneficial and harmful depends on whose
perspective, gene, individual, society.
8. Bodies are not machines.
9. There is no one normal genome.
10. From an evolutionary point of view, there are only
a few reasons why diseases exist at all.
Values
While many of our values are strongly socially influ-
enced, they arise from evolved preferences designed
to maximize reproductive success (Nesse, 1990). The
very preference for living instead of dying is the
most basic. People lacking this preference have been
selected against. Likewise, the wish for health and
good function, and the wish to get back to normal
when an illness strikes, are primal wishes. Yes, a
student facing an exam may welcome a minor infec-
tion, but this is merely a matter of tradeoffs. Funda-
mentally, people have a basic desire for health and
longevity. Thus, while some definitions of disease are
strongly socially influenced, there is a solid underpin-
ning to these values. Even apparent perturbations can
make sense in this context. People who believe that
their desire to masturbate is pathological, for instance
(Engelhardt, 1996, pp. 273–285), are responding to the
strong human tendency to wish to conform to social
norms, even if that is in conflict with their sexual
desires.
Defenses
The origins of the concept of disease are not in
pathology, but in suffering. Pain is the exemplar, but
nausea, fever, cough, malaise and all the other forms
of human suffering give rise to searches for relief.
These forms of suffering are products of natural selec-
tion. They are not diseases; they are defenses that help
to protect us (Williams and Nesse, 1991). Thepr s-
enceof pain indicates tissue damage and motivates
us to escape it and prevent recurrence. Thecapacity
for pain, by contrast, is a defense (Melzack, 1973).
People born without the capacity for pain are dead by
early adulthood. The same logic applies to the discom-
fort associated with rhinorhea, cough, vomiting and
diarrhea. These traits are latent until aroused by some
cue that expresses the defense.
Failure to recognize this distinction has caused
much confusion in medicine. General practice is, to a
considerable degree, the task of responding to people’s
wishes to be relieved of the discomfort that is asso-
ciated with the normal operation of defenses. The
tools now available to help are truly wonderful. Drugs
that block pain, fever, nausea, cough and malaise
make life better. Given that these aversive experi-
ences are useful capacities shaped by natural selec-
tion however, one has to wonder if we are harming
people by blocking their defenses. Sometimes we
are. Blocking diarrhea caused by shigellosis causes
increased complications and slower recovery (Dupont,
1973). What about taking aspirin for fever? Incredibly,
we do not know if it slows recovery from colds or
influenza despite abundant evidence for fever’s utility
(Kluger, 1979). The illusion that fever is unnecessary
is prevalent because the body has multiple mechanisms
for opposing infection; if one is blocked, the others are
usually sufficient.
A related point is of great importance to philosoph-
ical approaches to human suffering, and has practical
applications as well. Natural selection should shape
mechanisms that regulate defenses to give optimal
benefit. Yet it appears, from the generally beneficial
effects of blocking defenses, that these mechanisms
are released too early, too often, too much, and for
too long. Consideration of the optimum regulation
requires, however, consideration of the probabilities
of different outcomes and the costs and benefits of
different situations. If the cost of vomiting is 500
calories, then vomiting will pay off whenever this
is less than the cost of a threat, times the proba-
bility that the threat is present. If the threat is an
illness that would eliminate five days of food gather-
ing at 2000 calories per day, then the response should
optimally be expressed if the risk of the threat being
present exceeds 5% (500/10,000). This means that 19
times out of 20, the vomiting will be unnecessary, but
completely normal. This simple calculation gives great
hope that we can safely relieve much suffering, even as
it calls attention to the risks of blocking a defense that
20th time. The most important point here, however,
is that we must carefully distinguish defenses from
diseases. Furthermore, the capacities for suffering are
not abnormal, but sophisticated evolved capacities. In
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short, suffering usually indicates some pathology or
challenge, but is, it, useful.
Natural selection shaped maximal reproductive
success, not health
Consideration of the expected products of natural
selection is even more sobering. It seems natural to
expect that selection will shape a body for maximum
health and longevity. This is, unfortunately, incorrect.
Genes become more frequent in the gene pool if they
make bodies that yield greater than average net repro-
ductive success. If a mutation causes a disease, but
yields a net increased reproductive success, it will be
selected for. If a gene causes life to be shorter, but
more fecund, it will be selected for (Williams, 1957).
Instances of each effect are known, and many more are
likely to be found.
In general, health and longevity contribute to repro-
ductive success. It is only when they conflict that
things get interesting. The best example is the early
death of half the human population, the feeble sex,
males. Males have immune systems weakened by
testosterone, and brains, similarly influenced, that
induce them to dangerous displays of their machismo.
They fight and kill each other and compete to no
apparent purpose except to gain relative status and to
impress women. These purposes turn out, of course,
to strongly influence reproductive success. They influ-
ence both access to resources and desirability to
females. Variation in female reproductive success is
smaller than that of males. In species where there is
strong competition for females, especially polygynous
species, males whose life energies are concentrated
into an intense burst early will out-reproduce those
who live quieter, longer, healthier lives. Health is not
the outcome of natural selection, maximal reproduc-
tion is.
A related argument shows why aging is inevitable.
It is theoretically possible for an organism to have
the capacity to repair all of its tissues and to live
forever. The difficulty is that those repair mechanisms
are expensive and the resources could also be put into
current reproduction. Natural selection shapes lifespan
as a life history trait to maximize reproduction. The
genes that cause senescence persist for one of two
reasons (Nesse, 1987). First, some are never exposed
to selection, because they have no deleterious effects
during the lifetimes of animals in the wild. Other
forces kill all individuals before the effects of aging
genes have any effect, so there is no selection against
the aging genes unless, that is, the species passes
several generations in a new more benign environ-
ment, such as a zoo or laboratory, where long-lived
individuals will have a reproductive advantage. The
second reason genes that cause senescence persist is
because they also offer benefits early in life that are
greater than their costs later in life. Such pleiotropic
effects can increase the frequency of a gene even if
it causes substantial effects on life span in the wild.
The hypothetical example used by George Williams in
developing this idea was a gene that changed calcium
metabolism in a way that sped bone healing in youth,
but that steadily calcified the coronary arteries in adult-
hood (Williams, 1957). Because there are more indi-
viduals alive early in life, selection is stronger then,
thus magnifying the effect. Menopause is sometimes
seen as a problem for this point of view, however
most species do not show any cessation of reproduc-
ion with age, and the very existence of menopause
in humans may be a life history trait that maximizes
fitness, perhaps by ensuring care for existing children
instead of risking more reproduction.
It is tempting to say that some diseases of old age
are normal because they are statistically prevalent. I
believe this is a mistake. The body’s capacity to resist
disease of all types declines with age; consequently,
the frequency of nearly every disease increases. They
may be common, but they still are disruptions of
normal functioning.
Natural selection benefits genes, not individuals
So, natural selection makes organisms that maximize
their reproductive success, even at the expense of
individual happiness, health and longevity. There is
still one more factor to consider – whose reproductive
success is maximized? Two points are important here,
kin selection and “outlaw” genes. We have already
referred to kin selection by references to “net inclusive
reproductive success.” The word “net” reminds us
that the number of births is of relevance only as it
relates to the number of offspring that reach adulthood
and reproduce. Actually, what really matters is the
number of surviving grandchildren and great grand-
children. The word “inclusive” refers to the discovery
hat individuals can advance their gene’s interests by
helping other individuals who have genes that are
identical by descent. This is derived from Hamilton’s
principle of kin selection and it explains much other-
wise unaccountable self-sacrifice (Hamilton, 1964).
Examples such as a parent protecting its baby from
wolves are so expected as to be unremarkable. A better,
albeit subtle example, is when a mother allows an
offspring to continue to nurse beyond the time when
the mother’s direct reproductive interests would be
served by having another baby, because giving more
to the current offspring will eventually contribute to its
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ability to bear grandchildren. Later, nursing becomes
more conflicted. At some point, even taking inclusive
fitness effects into account, the mother’s interests are
served best by weaning but the infant tries to improve
its own reproductive success by continuing to nurse
(Trivers, 1974). The global conclusion is that natural
selection tends to shape mechanisms that benefit genes
in kin, even if that results in a cost to the self, including
vulnerability to disease.
A dramatic example illustrates the more funda-
mental point that phenotypes, that is individuals, are
devices constructed by genes to transmit themselves
to the next generation. In general, genes cannot do
anything to benefit themselves except by contributing
to the welfare of the individual and his or her kin.
There are, however, exceptions. So-called “outlaw”
genes advance their interests at the expense of the indi-
vidual. In general this is because they distort segrega-
tion during the formation of gametes and thus increase
their chances of being transmitted above the expected
50% (Haig, 1992). The means by which they accom-
plish this feat are more complex than the plot of a
4-hour spy movie, but in outline they seem to involve
pairs of genes, one of which disables or destroys any
zygote that lacks the partner gene that protects against
such effects. The T locus in mice is the best-studied
example (Franks and Lenington, 1986). No examples
are known in humans yet, but we may well come upon
them. The DNA in mitochondria, transmitted in the
ova from the mother, is not subject to the recombina-
tion that may help to limit the effects of such rouge
genes in the nuclear DNA. While outlaw genes are
so far not known to cause human health problems,
their very existence is a potent reminder that selection
maximizes benefits for genes, not individuals. We are
fortunate that the DNA in all of our cells is effectively
the same, and that the germ cells are sequestered in a
special cell line, thus ensuring the correspondence of
interests of genes and the individuals they make. I have
taken a bit of care in refraining from overly attributing
motives to genes, but it is always worth a reminder that
no planning or motives are in play here. Genes have no
interests, but their effects tend to increase or decrease
their representation in future generations, so it is hard
for human minds to avoid thinking of them as acting in
their own interests.
Normality
One way or another, most attempts to provide objective
criteria for disease depend on comparing normal to
a state defined as “abnormal.” This very slippery
concept has given rise to much difficulty. First off, in
everyday parlance it refers simultaneously to the pres-
ence of bodily defects, and to the social acceptability
or unacceptability of a condition. Attempts to separate
these two uses are opposed by powerful social forces
that insist on using the language of medical pathology
to label those people and conditions they disapprove
of, and yet hold unaccountable and in need of treat-
ment. Those same social forces systematically deny
the label “disease” to conditions they believe people
should be morally accountable for. For instance, in
the USA radio talk show hosts are currently gaining
much notoriety by claiming that homosexuality is a
choice, a position that is harder for liberals to oppose
now that homosexuality has been demedicalized. As
noted already, it is most difficult to define normality
without a comprehensive and detailed knowledge of
physiology and evolutionary history. From an evolu-
t onary point of view, if lack of sexual interest in
members of the opposite sex is shown to result from
autoimmune damage to a particular part of the brain,
then it is abnormal. If, however, it is shown to be a
facultative adaptation that is aroused only in certain
circumstances where it contributes to kin survival
and reproduction, then it would be an adaptation.
Although Wilson suggested this second possibility
(Wilson, 1975), I know of no evidence for it, and the
whole question is unresolved despite much specula-
tion. Is a suntan normal or pathological. It depends on
whether the color results from mere cell damage or an
organized special process, and whether the capacity for
tanning gives a net advantage or not. In this case it is
assuredly normal.
It is here that an evolutionary approach has the most
to contribute to the definition of disease. Our knowl-
edge of how natural selection has shaped the body and
how it works allows us to be quite confident about what
is normal and what is not in many instances that are
otherwise hard to assess. The key notion is that disease
is present when a bodily mechanism is defective,
damaged, or inadequate to the current challenge. Thus,
Huntington’s chorea results from a defective gene, and
congestive heart failure can result from a defect in
the mitral valve. Damage to the brain after a stroke
is clearly an abnormal state, as is inability to walk
whether because of a twisted ankle or an infected joint.
Influenza results when the body’s defense mechanisms
are inadequate to repel the virus, heat stroke when
the ability to regulate temperature is inadequate. In
every such case, however, the recognition of pathology
depends on a comparison of the current body’s mech-
anisms to those of another body that is healthy. I
can see no way around this. Disease is a disadvant-
ageous difference from normal; this requires a way to
recognize what is normal, a difficult task, as already
noted.
Our knowledge that the body is shaped to maximize
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the reproductive success of its genes is helpful. The
strong implication is that any deviation from the
usual state of the mechanisms will lower reproductive
success, and we can assess whether a state is patholog-
ical or not by determining its deviation from the usual
and its effects on reproductive success. There is no
need to be distracted here by individuals who use birth
control. Such a novel environmental factor distorts the
reproductive outcome, but there is no reason to think
that people in the natural environment would be shaped
to seek to have children. Seeking to have sex was fully
sufficient except in rare circumstances. Whether these
rare circumstances were frequent enough to shape a
desire for children independent of a desire for sex is an
interesting question. Perhaps couples that fail to have
children lose interest in the relationship. Also, the huge
medical investments made by infertile couples seem
so suggest a primary desire for offspring, but it may
be simply that they perceive the pleasures of having
children, and want to partake.
A few examples of potentially difficult cases will
illustrate this approach. Pregnancy certainly can be a
malady (Clouser et al., 1997), but it nonetheless is
perfectly normal. It is associated with increased risks
of pathology, but this does not justify calling preg-
nancy abnormal or a disease. Likewise, senescence
involves the gradual decrease in reserve capacity in all
tissues, with resulting increased risks of nearly every
disease. Senescence itself is normal, not just because
it happens to everyone, but because we can see how it
results from a combination of selection for pleiotropic
genes that give a benefit in youth despite their later
costs, and genetic mutations that accumulate despite
causing damage late in life because natural selection
is too weak at that time in life to eliminate them. The
diseases associated with old age remain diseases, even
if nearly everyone gets them, and even if the genes
that cause them offer other benefits. Cataracts and
Alzheimer’s disease interfere with normal mechanisms
and function. One might be tempted to say that such
conditions at such ages do not much influence repro-
ductive success, and so are not diseases, but they do
disrupt normal function. Besides, individuals at any
age can help their kin, and they can do this better if
they can see, walk, hear, and remember.
What about the farsightedness that affects everyone
in middle life? It results from the universal stiffening
of the lens, probably a result of tissue oxidation.
This case is a bit more ambiguous because it happens
to everyone. Nonetheless, it decreases function by
disrupting a normal mechanism, so I would call it a
universal disease resulting from a tradeoff that makes
repair of such damage impossible.
Nausea and vomiting during pregnancy is another
challenging example. It happens to most, but not all
pregnant women, starting a few weeks after concep-
tion and stopping at the end of the first trimester. It is
certainly a malady, but is it a disease? That depends
n whether it is an abnormality or a defense. Marjorie
Profet has suggested that it is a defense that prevents
pregnant women from eating food that have toxins
that might interfere with tissue differentiation (Profet,
1992). If this is true, then it is a defense. If not,
then it might be a disease. If protection against toxins
could be accomplished equally well without the nausea
and vomiting, then it is a defense, but one that is
constrained to a suboptimal design that results in a
disadvantageous syndrome. Instead of trying to figure
out if this is a disease or not, it may be more productive
to use it as an example of a condition that challenges
the notion that diseases are essences distinctly separate
from normal conditions.
Hypothetical conditions
Next, I would like to consider some hypothetical
conditions that should prove illuminating. The first
is an actual condition, manic-depressive illness. Indi-
vidual differences in susceptibility to this condition
depend mainly on genetic differences (Goodwin and
Jamison, 1990). Yet manic-depressive illness is asso-
ciated with a high suicide rate and considerable addi-
tional dysfunction secondary to alcohol and drug use
and the social complications of manic and depressive
behavior. The question is, of course, how genes that
cause such a condition can persist. I suspect, as others
have, that these same genes, in other combinations,
provide advantages. There is considerable evidence for
increased creativity in manics and a bit of evidence that
their relatives are also especially creative (Jamison,
1993). No one has, insofar as I know, looked to see
if people with manic depression or their relatives are
especially sought after sexual partners or whether they
have more children than other people.
For the sake of argument, however, let us imagine
that the presence of genes for manic depression give a
slight but definite reproductive advantage. If this were
the case, they would gradually increase in frequency
until they became universal. One can imagine a species
in which almost every individual is subject to wild
highs and lows of mood; only a few deviants would
have steady mood. In such a condition, would manic
depression still be a disease? According to my defini-
tion based on deviation from some normal state of the
species, it would not be. But compared to the behavior
regulation of our current species, it certainly would be
abnormal. Compared to objective criteria of longevity
and ability to function, it would be disadvantageous,
but if reproductive success is the only criterion, one
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would have to call it normal. Actually, if the above
scenario were true, there would be selection for modi-
fier genes that allowed the benefits of the condition
to continue, while ameliorating the costs. Thus, its
evolutionary status would be the same a gout, a disease
that results from genes that generally give a selective
advantage.
A related cause of disease is male behavior. It
is hard to comprehend the magnitude of testosterone
effects on health behaviors. The mortality of males is
a bit above that of females throughout childhood, but
at puberty the mortality ratio skyrockets. According to
calculations I have recently conducted on 1996 data
from the USA National Center for Health Statistics,
at early sexual maturity the mortality rate for males
is three times as high as for females. It gradually
decreases, but does not reach equity until age 100.
The difference results largely from accidents, violence,
and the complications of drugs, alcohol and risky
sex, but of the 15 leading causes of disease, 14 are
higher overall for men. A mutation that decreased the
effects of testosterone would markedly improve human
health. By a crude calculation I made, just over 25%
of all years lost to premature death could be elim-
inated if male death rates matched females. But the
effects on any intervention on Darwinian fitness might
be substantial and negative. Being male harms health
by increasing vulnerability to many causes of disease
and injury, but is not abnormal, it is just a tradeoff.
It is the results that are abnormal. If it specifically
disrupted the operation of some normal physiological
mechanism, I would be inclined to call it an abnor-
mality that arises as a result of a tradeoff. All of this
illustrates how a detailed approach reveals the lack of
specificity of common terms.
Another example involves the different effects of
a trait at different ages. We have already examined
senescence and seen how genes that cause such deficits
can nonetheless be selected for. Consider, however, a
gene that makes a sperm swim faster than others, but
that causes a serious disease later in life, a possibility
made more likely for humans by the recent finding
that genes that code for sperm proteins evolve very
rapidly (Wyckoff et al., 2000). Or, alternatively, a gene
that increased the implantation rate of fertilized ova
above the usual 25% but that has major health costs
late, as has been suggested for the DR4 allele (Rotter
and Diamond, 1987). In each case, the huge repro-
ductive advantage would give the gene a net selective
advantage despite the cost to health. Then there would
be selection for any modifier gene that ameliorated the
effects of the gene that made sperm swim faster or
the zygote implant more readily. Such complexities
suggest that unraveling the functional significance of
each gene will be a convoluted task, likely much more
challenging that merely finding the sequence of the
genome.
Three perspectives
A theme recurs in these examples – at which level of
selection should we define abnormality? A condition
can benefit the gene, but harm the individual. Should
we call this disease? Usually we do, because it is the
individual who seeks help for suffering and disability,
not the gene or the group. The values so often cited as
necessary for defining a condition as a disease gener-
ally refer to the benefits or costs to the individual,
irrespective of the benefits to the genes. But from
the gene’s point of view, they are not diseases at all,
just instances in which the optimal strategy requires
some sacrifice of the individual’s welfare (Dawkins,
1976). This gene’s eye view of disease is a bit prepos-
t rous, but it prepares for a parallel and more common
perspective on a different level, social groups.
If an individual has a tendency to do things that
benefit his or her self but are costly to the group, is
that behavior a disease? Usually, of course, individuals
benefit by contributing to the group, and the costs of
social deviancy or taking advantage of the group are
substantial (Frank, 1998). Nonetheless, the sociopath
can sometimes make hay, especially in large mobile
social groups. From the group’s perspective, such
behavior would be described as disease. From the indi-
vidual’s perspective, it may or may not be a disease. It
has been suggested that sociopathic behavior may be
encoded by genes that are frequency dependent, giving
an advantage only when they are rare, thus main-
taining considerable allelic diversity (Mealey, 1995).
I suspect that this hypothesis is not correct, mainly
because sociopaths often have other indications of
brain pathology, and because many of them do spectac-
ularly badly in life. There is no net reproductive benefit
on the average, even in our fluid society; in ances-
tral groups the selection against such individuals might
well have been fierce. Still, the example remains useful
to remind us that whether a condition is considered
a disease or not depends on whether the benefits are
considered from the point of view of the gene, the
individual, or the social group.
Normal function of bodies and machines
Consideration of pathology depends, as already noted
several times, on comparison with some normal state,
and the normality of a state depends on being able to
see how it serves a function, in this case contributing
to reproductive success. We have already said enough
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about reproductive success as a criterion for normal
function, but it is worthwhile noting how this related
to machines. Most of us use a tacit metaphor of a
machine when we think of the body. We think of the
engineer’s planning, blueprints, and the construction
of components with specific functions that contribute
to the overall functions of the machine. But the body
is not a machine, it is a body, and that is very different.
It is different because it was not designed, because its
function is not to serve any human or divine purpose
but only to maximize the reproduction of its genes,
and because it can be changed only in increments, not
by any major leaps. Furthermore, while there is one
master blueprint for a machine, there is no one normal
genome for the body. Likewise, there is no one perfect
phenotype. There are just phenotypes that emerge from
the products of genes interacting with environments.
Thus, there is no ideal type to use as a benchmark for
comparison to determine what is normal and what is
not. It does not make sense to ask if sickle cell allele is
normal or not; it is just an allele that give an advantage
in certain circumstances, namely, when paired with
a normal hemoglobin allele in an environment where
malaria is prevalent. Sickle cell disease is a disease
even if the sickle cell allele is selected for.
Does this kind of individual genetic variation give
the deathblow to definitions of pathology that rely on
comparison with a purported normal phenotype? Not
at all. While there is some genetic variation, and some
phenotypic variation, the vast majority of traits are the
same in all normal people. We all have a thyroid gland,
we all have ureters that empty into the bladder, we all
have salivary glands that make secretions as we antici-
pate or eat food. Deviations that negatively influence
the ability of these mechanisms to carry out their usual
tasks are pathological. This is objective and depends
on no social input. This said, it is worth repeating that
there is no one normal genome, no one normal pheno-
type that compare to a master blueprint and perfect
production model. Organisms are not machines.
Evolutionary causes of disease
The usual medical approach to explaining disease
is to look for the factors that explain individual
differences – why one individual has a disease and
another does not. These factors are drilled into every
medical student: genes, developmental abnormalities,
infection, inflammation, degenerative processes, nutri-
tional abnormalities, trauma, toxins, neoplasm, radi-
ation, and reproductive, psychogenic, and factitious
disorders. The list is not elegant, but it is serviceable.
An evolutionary approach asks an entirely different
question – why are all individuals in a species suscep-
tible to a disease (Nesse and Williams, 1994)? In other
words, why didn’t natural selection shape a body that
is better protected from that kind of disease? This
question is not about how people differ but about why
we are all have the same sub-optimal body. The old,
easy answer to the question was that natural selection
depends on chance, and is not all that powerful, so
you can’t expect the resulting product to be perfect.
Indeed, the stochastic nature and limited power of
natural selection do account for some our suscepti-
bility to disease, but several other reasons are even
more likely explanations. I will review each with an
example or two because our understanding of what
disease is will likely be illuminated by understanding
where disease comes from.
First, for orientation, a list of possible evolutionary
explanations for why the body is not better:
1. Defenses can be costly and dangerous even though
giving a net benefit.
2. Competition between different organisms.
3. Novel environmental factors the body is not
evolved to cope with.
4. Tradeoffs in design parameters.
5. Constraints on the process of natural selection.
6. The body is shaped for reproductive success not
health.
7. The body is shaped for genes, not individuals.
8. Chance factors.
Defenses we have already covered. They are not
diseases or causes of diseases, but latent mechanisms
that are aroused by cues that a problem is present.
They are usually aversive, and sometimes they lead
to pathology or become pathological by dysregulation.
Thus, diarrhea clears toxins from the large bowel, but
can also cause fatal dehydration, and the symptoms
can continue when the threat is past.
Competition between organisms causes disease
because natural selection for our defenses cannot keep
ahead of natural selection acting on other organ-
isms. The paradigmatic case is, of course, infec-
tion. Bacteria and viruses evolve faster than we do.
The wonder is that metazoans exist at all! A whole
world of complexity exists here, with selection for
increased and decreased virulence, and arms races
between defenses and counter-defenses that lead to
expensive and elaborate and fragile mechanisms that
are dangerous in themselves (Ewald, 1994). Our
immune system, for instance, causes tissue damage
in all of us, and autoimmune diseases in some of
us. Selection could change the parameters to decrease
these costs, but only at the larger cost of making us
more vulnerable to infection.
Competition with larger organisms, predators, is a
problem our species has largely conquered by extermi-
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nating or controlling them. Another class of organ-
ismic competitors remains a grave threat to health,
however, and that is conspecfics – members of our
own species. The whole issue of war is too complex
to get into here, but everyday competition saps our
energy and causes stress and its complications, to say
nothing of anxiety anger and general dissatisfaction
with life. The irony is that this competition seems to
be unending. Even in communities where everyone is
well-fed, financially secure and has a healthy mate and
children, social competition is often brutal and a cause
for much pathology
Novel environmental factors cause much, perhaps
most, disease now (Eaton, et al., 1988). Our bodies
were shaped for optimal function on a much more
limited diet in an environment where everyone needed
to spend 3–4000 calories a day just to get food. The
current epidemics of arteriosclerosis, stroke, hyperten-
sion, diabetes, obesity, alcoholism, drug addition and
eating disorders result from the mismatch between our
bodies and the environments in which we now live.
This is not to say that health was better back then,
absolutely not! But the majority of health problems
today arise from exposure to novel environments.
Even our impulses are poorly suited to our environ-
ment. In the Paleolithic, a craving for sugar, salt, fat
and leisure gave a net benefit. Now it leads us to
create social structures like grocery stores that satisfy
our evolved needs, and simultaneously cause most
disease. The genes that contribute to these diseases,
such as most genes associated with high cholesterol,
are not defects, but “quirks” that posed no selective
disadvantage in our normal environment.
Tradeoffs restrict the durability and performance
of machines and bodies alike. You can’t have a car
that gets 50 miles to the gallon and goes from 0 to
60 mph in 6 seconds. Tradeoffs are inherent in any
design. Thicker bones would break less readily, but
would make us clumsy. Our eyes could be reshaped,
like those of an eagle, to detect small motions from
hundreds of meters away, but our color and peripheral
vision would suffer proportionately. Uric acid levels
could be lower to prevent gout, but then our tissues
would be more quickly damaged by oxidation.
Constraints of various sorts limit the perfection
that natural selection can achieve. The most severe
constraints arise from the design of the information
system itself, the genome. Errors creep in, and some
of them become more frequent by drift. The fact that
the genome is essentially digital, with alleles present or
absent, results in pleiotropic costs from some genes tha
have costs as well as benefits. Diploidity gives advan-
tages, but having two copies of each gene makes room
for heterozygote advantage, with resulting diseases
like sickle-cell anemia. And while DNA repair is
excellent, it is not perfect, so problems arise. Then
there is the matter of sex itself, apparently essen-
tial for most organisms, but giving rise to vulnerable
extravagances shaped by sexual selection, that increase
mortality. As if these constraints were not enough, the
whole system is path dependent – it can go forward
by tiny increments, but can never start fresh. Finally,
chance factors result in the loss of potentially benefi-
cial genes, the absence of mutations that simply have
never occurred, and the incorporation of deleterious
bits of DNA.
What is the significance of these evolutionary
principles for understanding what disease is? First,
they emphasize that disease is not something that
can be avoided completely. Some disease results
from competition with other organisms. Defenses
that would more completely prevent infection are not
possible because pathogens evolve faster than we do
and because better defenses would cause more damage
our tissues than the benefit they offer. Diseases that
arise from our novel environment can be prevented,
but only by huge efforts to control our innate predis-
positions and preferences for fatty foods and leisure.
Others arise from tradeoffs in design, or from the
limits of natural selection. There are not just a dozen
diseases, there are thousands. This is the result of
natural selection. It can shape protection only from
problems that occur, so almost any problem that can
occur, does occur. Problems that are common should,
until evidence shows otherwise, be considered to
be results of organismic competition or a mismatch
between the body and the environment,
Another implication is that most diseases have
objective status independent of our values. Conditions
that involve defects, damage or deficiencies of evolved
mechanisms are abnormalities. We may not want to
call them diseases unless our (partly evolved) values
indicate a wish to change them, but they are abnormal
just the same. Tiny deviations from normality do not
influence fitness, but in the vast majority of instances
we can identify exactly what bodily mechanism has
failed and how. Soon, we will pay more attention also
to why.
So, what is disease? It seems to me that philos-
ophers have answered the question relatively well,
given the constraints of trying to provide a definition in
words. Yes, there is disagreement, but for the reasons
mentioned, no single definition will serve all the func-
tions demanded of it. An individual has a disease
when a bodily mechanism is defective, damaged, or
incapable of performing its function. The continuing
debates about the definition of disease arise partly
from the hope that a logical definition can be found
that conforms to common usage based on prototypes,
partly from attempts to seek the essence of disease
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without reference to all the complexity of the mech-
anisms of the body and their origins and functions,
and partly from the political and moral implications
of labeling a condition a disease. We will undoubtedly
see if further pursuit of these debates will, or will not,
deepen our understanding of what is disease, and what
disease is.
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